--The Honorable Dennis Jacobs, Chief Judge United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The multiplication of rules and standards, carrying in its train as it does endless debate over boundaries, is one of the banes of the American legal system, a source of its appalling complexity. I use public choice theory and the "new institutionalism" to discuss the incentives, proclivities, and shared backgrounds of lawyers and judges. In America every lawmaking judge has a single unifying characteristic, regardless of their political affiliation, judicial philosophy, race, gender, or religion. Every American judge is a former lawyer.
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This shared background has powerful and unexplored effects on the shape and structure of American law. This Article argues that the common characteristics, thought-2 Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) . 3 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (Harvard University Press 1995)
. 4 As I will discuss below, not all complexity fits this description. Some complexity adds granularity and particularity to the law, reducing indeterminacy. 5 There are some magistrate level judgeships filled by non-lawyers. See DORIS M. PROVINE, JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1986).
processes, training, and incentives of Judges and lawyers lead inexorably to greater complexity in judge-made law.
Complexity benefits lawyers by raising the demand for and difficulty of legal services, but more importantly, the crafting and creating of complex legal arguments are what many lawyers most enjoy about the practice. This is especially so for the lawyers who enjoyed and succeeded in law school. These same lawyers then become law-making judges and continue to enjoy complexity as the very heart of the legal process. Law making judges also gain the benefits of creating complexity (the actual opinion crafting)
while trial courts bear the main costs (the application of complexity). The only cost to the appellate courts is facing later cases under the complex law, but for the reasons noted above for appellate judges complexity is not a bug; it's a feature. There is an old adage that hard cases make bad law. A corollary is that interesting cases make unnecessarily complex law. This is especially so if complexity can allow a judge to hide a policy preference within a thicket of complexity.
These factors and more lead to the following prediction: judge-created law will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal complexity;
and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered prestigious. In the interests of brevity I choose a single area of law -standing -as my case study, but there are many alternative examples. 6 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I places this work in context with my earlier treatments of lawyers and judges. Part II defines the legal complexity at issue and canvasses some of the previous work in the area. Part III describes the institutional characteristics and internal incentives of both the legal profession and the law-making judiciary: who they are, their career and educational experiences, what they do, and what incentives drive their behavior. Part III then uses this institutional analysis to state why both lawyers and law-making judges tend to favor complexity. Part IV offers the law of standing as a case study in judge-made complexity.
I. THE LAWYER-JUDGE HYPOTHESIS
In recent years I have spent a great deal of time applying the tools of public choice theory and the new institutionalism to American judges and lawyers. In America almost all judges are formerly lawyers, and the central insight of my work has been that this has powerful, and in some cases insalubrious effects on the shape of American law.
In my first foray into this area I limited myself to the regulation of the legal profession itself. In America the regulation of lawyers is exclusively controlled by State Supreme Courts. As a general rule State Supreme Courts claim this power as a result of separation of powers doctrine and their "inherent authority" over the practice of law. The exercise of this authority has wide-ranging consequences: both the rules of entry and rules of professional conduct for the legal profession are controlled in the final instance
Another example is the federal law of employment discrimination. State law and precedents have dealt with wrongful discharge cases for years, and offer a relatively simple procedural and substantive framework. By comparison federal employment discrimination law has grown more and more arcane over the years, with a multistep procedure for presenting the proof and tangled substantive law. Consistent with the dictates of public choice theory, this advantage has played out to the benefit of the legal profession as a whole and to the detriment of the public.
Collective action problems, agency capture, and rent-seeking are even more pronounced in lawyer regulation than in other areas, because of the confluence of interests between judges and lawyers, and the lack of public knowledge or power to address the situation.
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More recently I have stretched the theory beyond the results in regulation to case specific areas where judges have clearly favored the interests of the legal profession over the public. My lawyer-judge hypothesis posited that whenever a legal issue impinges upon the interests of the legal profession as a whole judges tend to choose the result that benefits lawyers. Some of the cases I analyzed are a result of judges looking out for their own, but more often the cases result from a judge's innate sympathy and empathy for the alleged plight of lawyers.
So, for example, the lawyer client relationship is powerfully protected in legal proceedings by the lawyer-client privilege, the oldest and strongest of the evidentiary privileges. By comparison the doctor-patient or priest-penitent privileges are much weaker. Similarly, legal malpractice claims are among the hardest types of torts to win.
In most legal malpractice cases a plaintiff must prove a "case within a case" to satisfy the element of causation. Thus, the plaintiff must establish not only negligence; she must also establish that "but for" the negligence she would have won (and collected on) the underlying case at trial. By contrast, in many states a patient can recover against a doctor for a "lost chance" of survival regardless of whether the doctor's error was the "but for"
cause of death.
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In this Article I add another, broader layer to my argument that the tight connection between lawyers and judges has significant and costly real world consequences. This Article argues that the unique relationship and similarity of backgrounds, skills, and incentives of lawyers and judges leads them to work together to increase legal complexity.
II. LEGAL COMPLEXITY
Before launching into the argument it is necessary to first define legal complexity and then briefly describe some of its costs and benefits. We start with definitions. 15 I say "to a lesser extent" not because these courts produce less law (they actually produce much more), but because they are not courts of last resort, so they tend to create less far-reaching law. 16 Separating these courts, and their various institutional backgrounds, incentives and proclivities is one of the key additions this Article offers, as many previous studies of legal complexity have focused on the interests and actions of the judiciary as a whole, instead of considering the great differences between each level of the judiciary, and Supreme Courts' greater capacity for adding complexity and while bearing little of the costs for any such addition. proceed. This may explain why so many entrepreneurs plow forward without legal advice for as long as possible. Rather than pay for expensive advice that offers few actual answers it's better to act now and hope for the best.
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I am also persuaded that American law grows more complex over time. I am not, however, arguing that we are facing a "complexity crisis," or that law is more complicated than ever before. To the contrary, while the term "legal complexity" is of a relatively recent vintage, recognition of the underlying phenomena is hardly new.
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Charles Dickens' Bleak House offers a particularly compelling portrait of a legal system out of control, buried beneath layers upon layers of complexity. 24 The indeterminacy of law has been a persistent thread of the legal realist movement, 25 and later the critical legal studies movement. This theory has been subject to two criticisms that are useful to the analysis here.
The first is to question whether more litigation does, in fact, lead to precedents that decrease uncertainty, or whether it just adds additional layers of complexity and uncertainty. 28 The second is whether Landes and Posner ignore the interests and activities of a key third party: lawyers. Paul Rubin and Martin Bailey have argued that the uncertainty and complexity of products liability law is a direct result of the interests of the lawyers who litigate those cases.
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Anthony D'Amato's Legal Uncertainty was one of the first attempts to explicitly connect the incentives of the players in the legal system to ever-increasing indeterminacy. suggests that a person disadvantaged by the application of a legal rule has a greater incentive to avoid the rule than the person advantaged by it has to affirm its application."
In sum, D'Amato argued that the legal system as a whole has a structural bias in favor of uncertainty and complexity.
Peter Schuck followed up on these insights with his own study of legal complexity. He similarly argued that legal complexity is growing and deleterious. He expanded upon D'Amato's analysis of institutional incentives by focusing on the benefits of complexity for legislators and their staffs, bureaucrats, litigants, lawyers and judges.
Each of these players has reason to favor complex and/or indeterminate rules. Complex rules allow much more freedom to each player in the system and less accountability, because it is costly for the public to decipher or lobby against complex systems.
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Schuck does not use the language of public choice, but it should be clear that complexity is an important tool in the arsenal of self-interested government officials, whether legislators, bureaucrats or judges. Complexity allows each of these officials to pursue their individual goals under cover of an opaque legal system that the public cannot disentangle. If an aggrieved member of the public wishes to change an area of the law she must first decipher it, and then try to understand exactly which government actor or actors are responsible for the situation at hand, and then lobby for change.
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31 Schuck, supra note 2, at 27-35. 32 In my previous work on judicial control of the regulation of lawyers I noted the substantial obstacles between the public and lobbying for a change in lawyer regulation. The first such barrier would be determining exactly who to contact, since State Supreme Courts control the regulation, not the legislature.
Schuck adds a second valuable insight -the craft value of complexity. All of the players in the legal system enjoy looking smart and building what they see as elegant and complex solutions to problems. Nevertheless, Schuck does not focus on why the craft value of complexity would be especially hard to resist for law-making judges, a subject I cover below.
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III. WHY LAWYERS AND LAW-MAKING JUDGES FAVOR COMPLEXITY
This Part argues that lawyers and judges both have strong incentives to increase legal complexity. I separate these reasons into two categories, crass and subtle. Public choice theory helps illuminate the crass considerations and the new institutionalism explains the subtle. I may be too kind to my colleagues, but I tend to think the subtle explanations actually better explain the complexity dynamic than the crass.
A. The Crass
Public choice theory is the application of economic analysis to non-economic behavior. When applied to government decision-making each governmental actor is independently rational and seeks to maximize personal utility. Thus, the easiest way to understand a governmental action is to consider the underlying institutional and individual incentives involved. Public Choice theory has also been used to show how narrow interest groups triumph in the political realm over more diffuse public interests.
Interest groups are able to deliver the things that legislators desire: campaign 33 One humorous aside about both D'Amato and Schuck's treatment of complexity is the large role they ascribe to legal scholarship in the trend towards complexity. contributions, votes, and assistance through lobbying. By delivering these items interestgroups can "purchase" self-interested regulations or laws.
Because courts are less open to lobbying than legislatures some public choice theorists have assumed that judicial decision-making is less affected by interest group pressures. 34 Nevertheless, a review of judicial behavior towards the legal profession well establishes that judges are hardly immune from external pressures on their decisionmaking, especially when those pressures come from the legal profession.
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As such, I usually find it useful in predicting judicial behavior to begin with the incentives of the legal profession. Lawyers have multiple reasons to favor complexity.
First and foremost, across the legal profession lawyers are selling a single goodtechnical expertise of the legal system. The more complicated that system is (and that includes procedural and substantive complexity) the more business there will be for lawyers.
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If the system were to grow simpler, usage of lawyers would tumble, and that is true regardless of the subject area involved. Consider the push towards non-lawyered mediation (whether electronic systems such as Ebay's or in-person mediation) as a less expensive and simpler system of dispute resolution. Litigants have moved towards these less formal dispute resolution mechanisms to avoid the expense and complexity of traditional court proceedings. effect on the law. The sum total of each of these individual case decisions in favor of complexity snowball across the system leading naturally to entropy.
Complexity is not, however, generally good for society as a whole, or legal clients specifically. Nevertheless, because of informational asymmetry and agency costs clients are not usually in a position to advocate for a simple result over more complexity in any given case, let alone across the law in general. 40 Moreover, note the unique nature of the collective action problem. On the whole, complexity is a great detriment to the purchasers of legal services. But on an individual basis, complexity can be a client's best friend, especially if an able lawyer utilizes that complexity towards a better individual case result. 41 Thus it is not just that an individual incentive towards sloth overwhelms a group benefit: in legal complexity the individual choice in favor of complexity actually carries benefits to each individual client.
Complexity would not, however, seem like it would much benefit courts.
Complex systems are harder to administer, so perhaps courts should serve as a natural barrier to complexity. As the growth in legal complexity shows, this has not proven to be the case. A study of judicial incentives and behavior helps explain why.
There are multiple reasons for judges to follow lawyers and favor complexity.
The first is that the courts that are most affected by complexity -trial courts -are not the courts generally responsible for its creation. Law-making appellate courts are in charge of creating precedential complexity, and complexity only affects them the next time that issue appears on appeal. These courts are not on the front line of deciphering or applying complexity.
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Second, lawyers favor complexity consciously and unconsciously, and selfinterested judges will always work in accord with the desires of lawyers, because they are the repeat players in the system, and the judiciary's main customers and patrons. One of the critical lessons of game theory is that players in iterated games have a strong incentive to cooperate, 43 while players in one time games like the classic prisoner's dilemma discourage cooperation. 44 Consequently, lawyers and judges will naturally want to work together, judges and most litigants, not so much. Third, just as complexity has benefits for the legal profession as a whole, it carries great benefits for the law-making judiciary as well. Complexity makes it easier to decide almost any case in line with the judge's other preferences. 50 Scholars who advocate models of judicial behavior that focus upon non-legal explanations for judicial behavior, like the attitudinal model or critical race scholars, have thus often looked to complexity as the cover for true judicial motivations.
Fourth, while complexity does have costs, lawyers do a great deal of every judge's work. In the advocacy system most judges rely on the lawyers to do the bulk of the work in trying, briefing, researching, or investigating cases. When the system is 47 Barton, supra note 6. 48 LoPucki, supra note 31. 49 Id. working properly the judges sit back and decide cases based on the legal and factual work of the lawyers.
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On appeal the lawyers generally find and research the law, place it in written briefs, and then apply it to the facts at hand for the judges. As such, complexity arrives for the judge hand-wrapped by the litigants. Judges can, of course, disregard the lawyers' legal research or theories of the case. But insofar as that requires independent research or a novel legal outcome (and in many cases a simplification of the law would be novel) substantial additional work is required, and the judge risks the opprobrium of other judges or the legal profession. Thus, paradoxically, a judge seeking simplicity will have to work much harder than a judge who applies the complex theories and law presented by the lawyers in the case.
Fifth, while innovation in almost all areas of legal practice and judging has been painfully slow, 52 one area of a judge's work -writing opinions -has been greatly streamlined by word processing technology. One hundred years ago it took substantial physical effort to write or edit a legal document. Even forty years ago judges worked through multiple drafts, hand-writing their changes in an effort to reach a final edit.
Word processors have revolutionized this process, so a physical barrier to complexity (the hassle of committing it to paper) has been removed. 51 This aspect of the judicial incentive structure has led directly to higher barriers to entry -including requiring law school and a passing grade on the bar exam -because judges and current lawyers both profit when entry tightens. Lawyers profit from decreased competition and judges profit from better lawyers to work up their cases. Barton, supra note 6, at 1189-92. 52 Gillian Hadfield has recently argued that the regulation of lawyers itself has stifled legal innovation and costs consumers of legal services a great deal. Hadfield, supra note 20.
Lastly, as noted below, law-making judges like complexity. It's likely that they were good at complexity as lawyers, and it is likely why they sought a job as a judge in the first place.
B. The Subtle
One of the key insights of the new institutionalism is that human behavior is bound by "institutions." The new institutionalism defines institutions broadly as "formal and informal rules that constrain individual behavior and shape human interaction.
[They] are the framework within which human interaction takes place." 53 Institutions are thus a constellation of behaviors, rules, and norms that bind and constrain groups of individuals. By contrast, "organizations" are groups of people working together, like a company, the judiciary or a legislature.
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Legal thought itself is a powerful and constraining institution. In considering a judicial and lawyerly taste for complexity it is critical to understand how the institution of legal thought is developed and passed on within the legal profession and the judiciary. It is thus worth describing the career path of the law-making judge in America and how it leads inexorably to a taste for complexity. The lawyers who are selected to be law-making (i.e. appellate) judges come from the elite of the profession. 57 As members of this elite, these lawyers have mastered the skills involved in the creation and understanding of legal complexity. 58 Furthermore, it is likely that they actually quite enjoy the entire process. When lawyers, judges, or law . 58 As support for this contention, consider that a study of federal appellate judges that found that most selfidentified "innovators" (those judges more comfortable with judicial lawmaking) had attended prestigious law schools, while most "interpreters" had not. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAl JUDICIAL SYSTEM 167-68 (1981).
professors talk about a "true love of the law," they are talking about this exact process of digesting and generating complexity.
In addition to the sorting process of law school and practice, it is worth noting the power of self-selection for law-making judges. Many, if not most, of these judges have not taken their jobs for the money. Most earned or could earn more in private practice. It is likely that some chose the work for prestige, or job security (for judges appointed for life), or for a lighter workload, but there is another substantial non-economic benefit to becoming a law-making judge: the work itself.
American Judges who hear appeals have jobs that are radically dissimilar from the jobs of most lawyers or even district court judges. Law-making judges spend the vast majority of their time reading briefs, researching the law, and writing opinions. They hear oral arguments, but on a limited schedule and basis. They have very little contact with the public at large. As much as possible they delegate unpleasant or managerial tasks to staff and focus on the "fun" part of their job: legal reasoning and deciding cases. 59 Law-making judges thus spend almost all of their time engaged in the hermetic pursuit of legal complexity, a true "life of the law."
Every lawyer who becomes a judge knows what the job entails, and it is thus quite likely that they at least think they will enjoy it. A big part of the non-pecuniary benefit of the law-making judge is the pleasure (or "craft value" to use Schuck's terminology) that lawyers gain from legal complexity.
This helps explain why the "costs" of complexity don't deter law-making judges.
To law-making judges complexity isn't a bug; it's a feature. If complexity means that later interesting appeals raising new and different legal questions in the same complex area will arise in the future, that is sauce for the goose.
It is also worth noting the ways that complexity fits the judicial interest in "prestige," which generally means how they are perceived among lawyers and other legal elites. 60 Lawyers, legal academics, and other judges hold complex thinking and writing in high esteem. The more a judge is able to display a mastery of those skills the higher her concomitant prestige. This, in turn, raises the likelihood of judicial promotion, or other prestige-related benefits.
Paul Campos has also noted that an instinct as innocuous as the instinct to get each case right results in crippling complexity. "The emphasis on getting it right, and the agonized struggle to define just what that might entail, produce a distinctive vision of law that is totalizing, relentless, and most oblivious to such crass considerations as time, money, and possible limits to the powers of human reason." 61 Richard Epstein likewise noted the problem of seeking "perfect justice" in individual cases. 62 
C. The Prediction
A combination of the crass and subtle leads to the following prediction: the law will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal complexity; and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered prestigious. Areas staffed by elite lawyers tend towards complexity because elite lawyers tend to be the best at complex legal reasoning, and elite lawyers tend to have clients who can pay for additional complexity. If the area overlaps with an area of the law that the judge has a personal preference in, judges will bend towards complexity as a way to justify their decisions. Lastly, "prestigious" or interesting areas tend to exacerbate these other factors.
There are some obvious complex areas that fit these criteria, with constitutional law the clearest. Many lawyers became appellate judges specifically out of a desire to hear, think about, and decide complex constitutional cases. When those former lawyers get their chance to decide these cases reducing complexity is the last thing on their mind.
In sum, a brief review of the backgrounds, incentives, and proclivities of both lawyers and law-making judges establishes a strong, systemic bias towards complexity. I personally place more weight on the unconscious factors rather than a conscious bias, The Supreme Court has announced "three requirements that constitute the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing. First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, which is concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent. Second, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of some third party not before the court. Third, a plaintiff must show the substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact."
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In addition to the constitutional requirements there are a series of prudential individual member of the organization alleged that she had traveled to the specific land at issue. Justice Scalia wrote Lujan, and in addition to the narrow holding requiring a visit to the affected land, he stated a quite firm requirement that environmental plaintiffs state a "concrete and particularized" injury and set forth "specific facts" to support their claims, not just generalized harm from environmental degradation. 73 Thus Lujan had both a "personal" injury aspect (did the plaintiff personally visit the affected land) and a "concreteness" aspect (was the alleged injury concrete and particularized enough). The funny thing about this very, very brief description of one small corner of standing law is that even this black-letter and bare bones description of the law is bewildering, and I have made almost no effort whatsoever to describe or synthesize the cases themselves. I have not, because standing cases have been called "notoriously of all law reviews for the term "standing" in the same sentence as "complex" or "complexity" results in 1299 documents.
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There are several reasons why standing law is a great case study for the complexity theory laid out above. First, while standing may be virtually unknown outside of the legal profession, it is critically important to litigants. If a person is willing to suffer the expense and hassle of bringing a lawsuit in Federal Court, it is of tremendous importance that they not get bounced from court for lack of standing.
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Standing is also an invaluable tool for federal courts, because it is one of the main ways for courts to get rid of cases they do not like short of a decision on the merits. Third, standing is one of those areas of the law where it is obvious that the complexity involved is not the kind that leads to clearer application of the law on a more individual basis, i.e. standing complexity is not of the sort that might confer a benefit along with its costs. To the contrary, as standing law has grown more complicated its 82 I searched for "standing /s complex complexity" in the JLR database. 83 The expense and hassle of litigation are one of the most persuasive arguments against standing doctrine: if the Court is really worried about entertaining litigation where the litigants who do not truly care about their "case" or "controversy," the willingness to litigate alone should be strong evidence.
application has grown increasingly cumbersome and its applicability to any given set of facts has grown even harder to predict.
As noted above, this makes standing a valuable area of the law for lawyers. For any given Federal environmental or group rights case there is the strong possibility of a challenge to standing. Because of the confusion in the law this challenge will require a substantial amount of legal work for all the litigants, and it will allow clever lawyers to craft and re-craft highly technical arguments on either side of the issue.
Fourth, standing law well establishes the value of complexity for judges. As noted above, standing and related doctrines are an easy route for judges to get rid of cases they do not like, either because of political preferences or a distaste for the litigants or the subject area. Richard Pierce argues that lawyers can predict standing decisions "with much greater accuracy if they ignore doctrine and rely entirely on a simple description of the law of standing that is rooted in political science: judges provide access to the courts to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges."
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Standing is the perfect case for the complexity theory because the law is sufficiently complex that a judge has great discretion to decide whether or not to find standing, and yet still has plenty of complexity to cover her hindquarters in a learned written opinion or order. 84 Richard J. Pierce, Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742-43 (1999). Pierce establishes this argument as follows: "Five Supreme Court decisions issued between 1991 and 1998 illustrate the accuracy of the political scientist's description of the law of standing. In those cases, the Court resolved standing disputes applicable to environmentalists (two cases), employees, prisoners, and banks. In each case, the Justices divided either five-to-four or six-to-three on the standing issue. In each case, the "votes" of the Justices were as easy to predict as the votes of their ideological counterparts in the legislature. Liberals voted to grant access to the courts to environmentalists, employees, and prisoners, but not to banks. Conservatives voted to grant access to banks, but not to environmentalists, employees, or prisoners. Of course, in each case, all the Justices claimed to reach their politically preferred result through objective application of legal doctrines. The applicable doctrines are so malleable, however, that it is impossible to avoid the inference that the Justices manipulated the doctrines to rationalize their politically preferred results." Id. at 1743.
Fifth, standing also shows how judges are drawn to, and enjoy, complexity. The Supreme Court has returned again and again to standing in the last thirty years, with each new foray seemingly further muddying the waters. The cases are often split, and they frequently involve lengthy dissents and multiple concurrences. In short, there is little to suggest that the Justices dislike standing law, or that they see any particular need to clarify, avoid, or scrap it. To the contrary, the standing cases look to be the work of legal technicians and theorists who are enjoying themselves.
In short, the law of standing fits both the public choice and institutional analyses of the judicial bias towards complexity. It also perfectly fits the predictive portion of this paper: it involves an area where judges want flexibility to decide cases based on their own preferences, an area (generally constitutional cases or group challenges to federal action or statutes) that draws elite lawyers, and it's an area of interest for the judges.
V. Conclusion
At this point I hope I have convinced you that a combination of institutional and public choice factors lead both lawyers and law-making judges to favor complexity in law creation. The question of what, if anything, can or should be done about the problem, however, is harder to tackle. One hope is that judges will recognize the costs of complexity and adjust their behavior accordingly. Given the judicial taste for multifactor balancing tests and complicated procedures this result seems rather unlikely.
There is an old adage that hard cases make bad law. A corollary might be that interesting cases make unnecessarily complex law.
The problem is that any more fundamental changes require a radical reworking of the American Justice System. Adrian Vermeule has argued that at least some Supreme
